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hat happens to a country under constant surveillance? The recent
decision in Atkins v The Queen provides a partial answer.1 The sheer avail-
ability of images seems to be driving decisions about their admissibility
and use as identification evidence. Confronted with CCTV recordings associated
with criminal activities English courts have been reluctant to restrict their
admission or impose limitations on the scope or form of incriminating opinion
derived from them. Although the Court of Appeal decision in Atkins v The Queen is
concerned primarily with the way in which an opinion derived from CCTV images
was expressed, the decision exposes jurisprudential weakness and continuing
problems with photo comparison and facial-mapping evidence.
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1. Ground of appeal: ‘the issue of the expression of expert evidence’
In England, as in most other common law jurisdictions, opinion evidence is not
generally admissible. ‘Opinion based upon identifiable expertise outside the experience
of the jury is one exception’.2 According to the court in Atkins such ‘expertise’ must
be ‘identifiable’ and:
Courts need to be scrupulous to ensure that evidence proffered as expert,
for any party, is indeed based upon specialised experience, knowledge or
study. Mere self-certification, without demonstration of study,
method and expertise, is by itself not sufficient.3
At common law the judge is empowered to exclude opinion evidence where the
witness is not appropriately qualified or experienced, or where the opinion is not
based upon recognisable expertise. The appeal in Atkins:
… therefore does not raise any question as to the judge’s power at
common law to exclude evidence tendered as expert, if it be argued
that the expert is insufficiently qualified or that his evidence is insuffi-
ciently based upon expertise.4
Where there is an objection to admissibility, it is for the party ‘who tenders such
evidence to establish the exception, viz the expertise’. The party that ‘asserts
admissibilitymust demonstrate it’.5 In Atkins v The Queen the admissibility of photo-
graphic comparison work by Mr Richard Neave was contested.6
Significantly, English courts have not consistently required ‘knowledge’ or
‘reliability’ before admitting incriminating opinions in serious criminal
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2 Ibid. at [9] (italics added).
3 Ibid. at [27] (italics added). The Atkins court also stated that: ‘expert opinion evidence may be given
by reference to studies which the expert has done but which a jury does not see’ (at [17]).
4 Ibid. at [9] (italics added).
5 Ibid. at [9].
6 Richard Neave was the medical artist who prepared and presented the photographic comparison
evidence. We do not mean to question Neave’s expertise as a medical artist. The issue we raise is
whether extensive experience as amedical artist—or as an anatomist (as in R v Tang [2006] NSWCCA
167) or inmilitary intelligence—and experience in and out of courts provides an adequate basis for
the provision of incriminating expert opinion evidence derived from images.
proceedings.7 In relation to facial mapping8—that is, the comparison of images for
the purposes of helping to establish identity—cases such as R v Stockwell9 (also with
Neave), R v Clarke,10 R v Hookway11 (also with Neave), R v Briddick,12 Attorney-General’s
Reference (No. 2 of 2002)13 and R v Gardiner14 support the proposition that ‘a suitably
qualified expert with facial-mapping skills may properly give opinion evidence of
his comparison of images from the scene, enhanced or otherwise, and a
reasonably contemporary photograph of the accused’.15 Any dangers, such as
unreliability, exaggeration and misrepresentation, are issues going to the weight
assigned to the opinion at trial.
Because English courts have adopted a particularly liberal approach to the admis-
sibility of incriminating expert opinion, including facial-mapping evidence,16 ‘Mr
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7 Although the South Australian decision of Bonython (R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45) has been
influential and Courts of Appeal in R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31 and R v Ciantar [2005] EWCACrim
3559 placed emphasis on the need for reliability as part of English admissibility jurisprudence.
These are summarised in Ciantar at [21]: ‘The subject matter in the instant case, facial mapping,
must be part of a body of knowledge or experience recognised to be a reliable body of knowledge.
Secondly, the witness must be qualified to express an opinion by reason of his special
acquaintance with that body of knowledge’. See T. Ward, ‘English Law’s Epistemology of Expert
Testimony’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law & Society 572–95. Compare M. Redmayne, Expert Evidence and
Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001); A. Roberts, ‘Drawing on Expertise: Legal
Decision Making and the Reception of Expert Evidence’ [2008] Crim LR 443–62.
8 It is not our intention to suggest that facial mapping (or body mapping) are recognisable ‘fields’.
Even though English, and to some extent Australian, courts have recognised them as such, this
recognition is largely limited to forensic contexts and seemsmisconceived (for some of the reasons
described below). Similarly, the fact that some individuals have formed an organisation (see below
n. 17) does not overcome fundamental epistemological problems. The emphasis on reliability in
this note is intended to suggest that empirical evidence of ability and accuracy should be more
important than legal recognition or professional ‘bootstrapping’.
9 (1993) 97 Cr App R 260.
10 [1995] 2 Cr App R 425.
11 [1999] Crim LR 750.
12 [2001] EWCA Crim 984.
13 [2003] 1 Cr App R 21.
14 [2004] EWCA Crim 1639.
15 Dean Atkins and Michael Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 at [13] (italics added). In
Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 2002), above n. 13 at [19], the court indicated that ‘where awitness
who does not know the defendant spends substantial time viewing and analysing photographic
images from the screen, thereby acquiring special knowledge which the jury does not have, he can
give evidence of identification based on a comparison between those images and a reasonably
contemporaneous photograph of the defendant, provided that the images and the photograph are
available to the jury’. See also R v Abnett [2006] EWCA Crim 3320, [2006] All ER 244 at [14], [20].
16 Compare G. Edmond, ‘Pathological Science? Demonstrable Reliability and Expert Pathology
Evidence’ in K. Roach (ed.), Pediatric Forensic Pathology and the Justice System (Queen’s Printer for
Ontario: Toronto, 2008) 96.
Neave’s expertise in his field was accepted’ and the appeal in Atkinswas limited to
the use of the following graded scale (taken from an article by Bromby).17
Level Description
0 Lends no support
1 Lends limited support
2 Lends moderate support
3 Lends support
4 Lends strong support
5 Lends powerful support
The question confronting the Court of Appeal in Atkins concerned Neave’s
‘expression of the level of support’—between ‘“it lends support” and “lends strong
support”’—to the question of whether the accused (Dean Atkins) is the person in
low quality incriminating CCTV images. There was, as Neave conceded, no
database of facial features facilitating his move from noting apparent similarities
between the images of Atkins and the perpetrator, to a conclusion about their
significance. Nevertheless, the court explained:
… that where a photographic comparison expert gives evidence,
properly based upon study and experience, of similarities and/or
dissimilarities between a questioned photograph and a known person
(including a defendant) the expert is not disabled either by authority
or principle from expressing his conclusion as to the significance of his
findings, and that he may do so by use of conventional expressions,
arranged in a hierarchy, such as those used by the witness in this case
and set out … above.18
Such ‘conclusions’ are admissible provided their status as ‘subjective opinion’ is
‘made crystal clear to the jury charged with evaluating them’.19 The absence of an
‘expertise-based justification’ and lack of a database does not prevent a properly
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17 Dean Atkins and Michael Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 at [9]. M. Bromby, ‘At Face Value?
The Use of Facial Mapping and CCTV Image Analysis for Identification’ (February 2003) 153New Law
Journal: Expert Witness Supplement 302–4. The Forensic Imagery Analysis Group (FIAG) of the
British Association for Human Identification (BAHID) has embraced this scale and produced a
non-binding guidance sheet. This specious guide does not address the underlying image problems
or the lack of a database.
18 Dean Atkins and Michael Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 at [31] (italics added).
19 Ibid.
qualified expert from proffering an opinion about the identity of the person in
incriminating images whether as similarities or in more positive terms.
While it might be thought that this approach is reasonable and that facial
mappers should be entitled to express inculpatory opinions—and even though
here we are primarily concerned with the Court of Appeal’s approach to ‘level of
support’ scales—there are good reasons to doubt the reliability of much photo-
graphic comparison evidence. It should not be thought that fundamental
epistemological problems can be overcome simply by recourse to ‘conventional
scales’, putatively ‘cautious’ forms of practice or through the disclosure of
problems—such as Neave’s many concessions. The failure to test the technique, or
to have a clear idea about limitations and levels of error, means that many
purported similarities are simply of unknown significance.
2. Like(rt) magic: expressions of confidence
Although the Atkins court excused the absence of a database, provided the absence
is made ‘crystal clear’ to the jury, this concession does not allow us to move from
apparent (or alleged) similarities to reliable opinions about identity. The signifi-
cance of a database is that, were one available, it would facilitate this transition in
a meaningful manner and do so with some understanding of the limitations of
any conclusions.
(a) Similarities and differences: what a difference a database makes
At the heart of Atkins is the significance of apparent similarities and the alleged
absence of differences between the images of Atkins and the perpetrator (see Fig. 1
below).20 The question of whether we can be confident about similarities and
differences logically precedes the question of what significancemight be attached
to actual similarities (and/or differences). The failure to produce a credible and
reproducible technique for overcoming image distortions or to recognise the
limitations imposed by image resolution (and other ‘risk factors’) means that we
cannot be confident that alleged and apparent similarities (or differences)
accurately represent the underlying reality.21
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20 We use ‘apparent’ and ‘alleged’ because in the absence of non-contentious and highly discrimi-
nating ‘identifiers’ or a method for overcoming image distortions, similarities may be artefactual
or epiphenomenal rather than real.
21 For a discussion of image problems see G. Edmond, K. Biber, R. Kemp and G. Porter, ‘Law’s Looking
Glass: Expert Identification Evidence Derived from Photographic and Video Images’ (2009) 20
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 337–77.
Assuming that photographic interpretation was reliable (i.e. there was some
demonstrated means of overcoming or eliminating the range of distortions and
factors that affect reliability), what does itmeanwhenwe speak of similarities and
differences?22 Here, the issue of databases of facial features and extrapolations
from similarities assumes significance. To be useful, a database would include
measurements or standardised descriptions of the features from each of a large
number of faces sampled from several different population groups.23 Such a
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22 Here we are speaking about similarities and differences rather than the sometimes equally vexed
question of interpreting what is happening: L. Schwartz, Mechanical Witness: A History of Motion
Picture Evidence in US Courts (Oxford University Press, USA: 2009); N. Feigenson and C. Spiesel, Law on
Display (NYU Press: New York, 2009.
23 Though even this is deceptively complex. For there is no agreement about what should be
measured and there is no, byway of example, standardworkingmodel ofwhat constitutes a nose.
Figure 1. Copy of one of the set of images used by Neave. Consider the resolution
of the enhanced crime scene image on the left and the addition of grid squares in
the bottom frames. This copy image was taken from a PDF of the appeal
submissions, and some loss of detail in the copy is likely. With permission,
courtesy of Joe Stone.
database would allow us to estimate how frequently a particular feature occurs in
the relevant population and, critically, how often two or more features co-occur.
This latter aspect is especially important. In order to derive any conclusions from
the observation that images share more than one feature in common we must
knowabout the degree of statistical independence of these features in the relevant
population.24 For example, it may be that a particular nose shape is often
associated with a particular upper lip shape. In this case, the observation that both
features occur tells us littlemore than the observation of either feature on its own.
English (and Australian) facial mappers do not possess such a database and,
without such or in the absence of testing, cannot confidently draw conclusions
from patterns of similarities or differences in images.
To be clear, the court in Atkins is discussing themeaning of similarities in terms of
the identification of Dean Atkins. That is, how does the person comparing images
move from similarities to a level of confidence expressed as a ‘level of support’ for
the proposition that two or more images are of the same person (or different
persons—i.e. exclusion). Indeed, this is the question it formally addresses:
What is contended [by the appellant’s barrister] is that it was imper-
missible for the expert to say that in his view those similarities lent
something between support and strong support to the allegation that
the man in the camera shot was Dean Atkins. … It is contended that
such an expert should never use any of these expressions but should
be confined to identifying the similarities or dissimilarities between
the faces compared.25
And,
Mr Neave told the jury that he used these five different forms of
expression. In the present case, he said that in his opinion the similar-
ities which he had identified gave support to the proposition that the
man on the camera was Dean Atkins which he put somewhere
between ‘the top of (3) and into (4).’ This part of his evidence, as
summarised by the judge, was in these terms:
‘This comparison therefore offers a level of support for
the allegation that Dean Atkins and the offender are one
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24 This is not unlike the problem with the opinion evidence presented by Sir Roy Meadow in R v Clark
[2003] EWCACrim 1020 and R v Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725. It suggests the dangers of allowing even
highly qualified experts to base opinions on long experience.
25 Dean Atkins and Michael Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 at [1].
and the same person, between “it lends support” and
“lends strong support” to that conclusion. But you should
remember this, that, as Mr Neave conceded, there is no
database which would enable him to give a statistical
analysis and so his scale is based on his own experience
and expertise and, he added, in this case on the fact that
he was able to exclude a large number of people,
including one who was very similar to Dean Atkins, his
brother Michael.’26
The lack of a database withwhich to interpret the significance of particular combi-
nations of facial features is noted but excused and left to weight.27 The absence of a
database or some other credible method of assigning significance to purported
similarities means the observer has no reasonable basis on which to draw conclu-
sions about identity.28 This makes it necessary to invent a value (like ‘lends strong
support’), which is simply a subjective summation (or impression) lacking
methodological rigour.
Rather than focus on limitations inherent in the process by which the observer
moves from alleged similarities to identification, the effect that apparent similar-
ities and intuitive interpretations might have on the accuracy of the witness’s
conclusion, or the decision-making of lay fact-finders, courts simply require the
absence of a database—and not necessarily the significance or implications of its
absence—to be made transparent.
… the absence of a database is in particular a matter which must be
explained unequivocally to any jury considering such evidence.29
And,
On principle, we accept the caution with which any expression of conclusion
in relation to evidence of this kind (and others) needs to be approached. We
agree that the fact that a conclusion is not based upon a statistical
database recording the incidence of the features compared as they
appear in the population at large needs to be made crystal clear to the jury.
But we do not agree that the absence of such a database means that
no opinion can be expressed by the witness beyond rehearsing his
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26 Ibid. at [8]–[9].
27 See also R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 at 431–2.
28 Cf. Davie v Lord Provost, Magistrates and Counsellors of the City of Edinburgh (1953) SC 34 at 39–40.
29 Dean Atkins and Michael Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 at [16].
examination of the photographs. An expert who spends years studying this
kind of comparison can properly form a judgment as to the significance of
what he has found in any particular case.30
This means that where the witness concedes that there is no database—so that
their opinion is not probabilistic in any empirical sense—they are nevertheless
allowed to present a subjective incriminating opinion about the significance of
purported similarities because of their extensive experience:
… asMrNeave conceded, there is no database whichwould enable him
to give a statistical analysis and so his scale is based on his own
experience and expertise …31
(b) Problems with recourse to the Bromby scale: detailing the Emperor’s clothes
In Atkins we are told that the images were partial, fleeting and of poor quality.
Nevertheless, the witness concluded that:
… he could find no difference between the photograph of Dean Atkins
and the CCTV image on morphological examination and identified
particular similarities in eight different areas, of which the principal
were nose, mouth, upper lip and chin. The camera angles fromwhich
the photograph and the CCTV imagewere takenwere virtually identical
and thus sufficient to enable grid measurements to be made. These were also
consistent with the photograph of Dean, and so was the product of the
two superimposition or substitution tests.32
In the absence of a database and a set of procedures or standards for interpreting
photographs, we can only speculate about how photo comparison witnesses
transform apparent similarities (and lack of differences) into a level of confidence
about whether the person of interest is the suspect/accused.
Given the lack of a suitable database, the problem is on what basis can a witness
move from the interpretation of apparent similarities between person(s) in two (or
more) images to making claims about the meaning of those apparent similarities.
Actually, this predicament is neatly summarised by counsel for Atkins:
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30 Ibid. at [23] (italics added).
31 Ibid. at [8].
32 Ibid. at [6] (italics added). Use of the phrase ‘consistent with’ is critically analysed in several
Canadian inquiries into wrongful convictions. See below n. 63.
… the absence of any database cataloguing the numbers of persons
with particular facial features ormeasurementsmeant that therewas
no expertise-based justification for his expression of the level of
support which that comparison gave to the allegation that theman in
the photograph was Dean Atkins.33
As cursory inspection suggests, and the Court of Appeal confirms, the images
available for analysis in Atkins were of low resolution and ‘far from clear to the
naked eye’.34 Nevertheless, the facial mapper was willing—on the basis of a few
apparent similarities (of unknown frequency or independence), an apparent
inability to discern any dissimilarities, and practical indifference to the many ‘risk
factors’ (some of whichwere conceded)—to testify that there were only similarities
between the incriminating image and a reference image of Dean Atkins. Neave
concluded that the incriminating image ‘lent support’ or ‘strong support’ to the
contention that it was Dean Atkins at the crime scene. Here there is an implicitly
unproblematic move from limited similarity to a conclusion about identity (or
individualisation). In the absence of information about the frequency with which
particular facial characteristics occur in the population, or how commonly these
features exist in combination, the witness was prepared to say that one ormore of
the very low quality images provided ‘support’ or ‘strong support’ to his conclu-
sions about identity.
Not only is there a conceptual problem in moving from one or more apparent
similarities to identity, there is also the serious question of what kind of evidence
might properly ground support, let alone ‘strong’ and ‘powerful’ support.35 The
absence of an articulated and validated method, the inability to address the
frequency of facial features, or even address, let alone overcome, the reliability
issues suggest that the level of confidence apparent from the witness’s use of the
Bromby scale is not merely misguided, but misleading.
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33 Ibid. at [10]. Some of these difficulties were recognised by Mitting J in R v Gray [2003] EWCA Crim
1001. Although that decision is marginalised by the court in Atkins (at [12]–[16]) on the basis that it
is unreported, the particular facial-mapping expert ‘overstepped the mark’ and was shown in two
other cases to have beenwrong. Rather than invoke the ‘bad apple’ theory of experts, courts should
pay serious attention to the reliability of methods and conclusions. For, in the absence of evidence
of trustworthiness, how canwe be confident that currently acceptable comparison experts will not
also be exposed as mistaken?
34 Dean Atkins and Michael Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 at [6]. The authors have seen an
electronic copy of the images featured in the appeal documents. See Fig. 1 above.
35 The issues are not unique to photographic comparison evidence: see e.g. S. Cole, ‘Is Fingerprint
Identification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents’ Discourse’ (2006) 28 Law &
Policy 109–35.
We should not quibble over semantics or underestimate the significance and
potential unfair prejudice of incriminating opinion evidence in the adversarial
criminal trial. In the context of serious criminal proceedings a person with long
experience as a medical artist, who had previously been allowed to express
opinions about similarities and identification, was qualified as an expert and
allowed to express the opinion that images of a person from a crime scene lent
support to the Crown contention that Dean Atkins was the perpetrator.36
Regardless of any claims to the contrary, this evidence was presented and likely
understood as positive identification evidencewhereas, in reality, all thewitness’s
analysis tells us is that his interpretation of the shapes drawn from the images of
the perpetrator does not match the appearance of Atkins’ brother Michael, their
co-accused Carty, and a small number of known burglars living in the vicinity of
Uxbridge.37 Neave cannot know, and so does not tell us, how many other
individuals are likely to possess the apparent features noted in the images. It may
be that many men in the United Kingdom would match this image, or it could be
that no other person does so, but the jury were told that only Dean Atkins could
not be excluded. Neave might not have positively identified the accused but he
could see only similarities between Dean Atkins and the person of interest. To put
this another way, he could discern no differences and the photographic evidence,
according to this experienced practitioner, ‘lent support’, at the very least.
Facial mappers may choose to employ the Bromby scale in an attempt to make
their opinion appear more scientific.38 However, recourse to this scale makes the
absence of an underlying method more conspicuous. In some ways the illusory
precision of the scale creates problems for the witness. Had Neave instead
expressed his own intuitive impression, in his own words, this might have been
evenmore difficult to contest. Unwittingly, recourse to the Bromby scale serves to
reinforce the very serious methodological flaws and limitations with photo-
graphic comparison evidence and expertise.
In some ways Neave’s description of the process by which he superimposed grid
squares on the various images parallels the illusion created by the Bromby scale.
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36 Identity is, in effect, the ultimate issue. While the ultimate issue rule is now practicallymoribund,
courts should nevertheless be careful when those whose expertise is questioned endeavour to
express opinions on matters such as identity. See e.g. R v GK [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [40].
37 Without more, the fact that these features are not similar to (or shared by) other burglars of
Uxbridge is trivial though presumably misleading and unfairly prejudicial. The presentation of
these individuals as ‘foils’, especially where the analyst is not ‘blinded’, is alsomisleading and adds
little if anything to the reliability of any photographic comparison exercise.
38 There is an extensive literature suggesting that people cannot (or, at least, do not) use such scales
consistently. See e.g. L. Moxey and A. Sanford, Communicating Quantities: A Psychological Perspective
(Erlbaum: Hove, 1993).
Use of the grid implies a level of precision (whether anthropometric or morpho-
logical) that is also without foundation. In the absence of a credible means of
overcoming photographic distortion and other forms of unreliability, how can the
witness be confident that the features in each of the grid squares accurately
represent what the person of interest actually looks like? Can we, for example,
meaningfully compare the forms in the grid squares—whether individually or in
combination? Once again, a seemingly scientific apparatus, the grid, lends the
appearance of precision.39
In the end the inability to overcome distortion in conjunction with the lack of a
database means that all the witness can say is that in his opinion parts of the
mouth, nose and chin appear similar in these partial, poorly resolved images. The
absence of information about the frequency of facial features individually or in
combinationmeans that the witness cannot take this purported ‘match’ evidence
any further.
To draw an analogy, imagine that a biologist presented DNA evidence along the
lines that her analysis ‘lent very strong support’ to the conclusion that a badly
degraded trace sample yielding a partial profile came from the defendant because
it showed several similarities to a reference sample taken from the defendant and
she was unable to discern any differences between the samples. Now imagine that
under cross-examination this biologist conceded that she knew nothing about the
extent of the degradation of the sample and how its quality affected the reliability
of her conclusions, had no knowledge of the frequency of the features in the
partial profiles (apart fromwhat she had encountered in her laboratorywork), and
that there was no data in existence which allowed her to estimate the frequency
with which the partial profile appeared in the population.40 It is highly unlikely
that such evidence would be presented to a jury, even with the proviso that the
jury be told about the lack of a database and the opinion being experience-based.
Why then do courts choose to admit opinion evidence of a similar quality when it
concerns visual identification from images?
Perhaps the difference lies in our relative experience with biological trace evidence
and faces. We are all, to some degree, experts in face recognition (and experienced
with photographs and film via engagement with media and advertising).
However, familiarity with faces may encourage experts and judges (and jurors) to
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39 See e.g. T. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton
University Press: Princeton NJ, 1995).
40 Compare J. Aronson, Genetic Witness: Science, Law, and Controversy in the Making of DNA Profiling
(Rutgers University Press: Piscataway NJ, 2007); M. Lynch, S. A. Cole, R. McNally and K. Jordan, Truth
Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2008).
underestimate the difficulties involved in facial and photographic comparisons.41
Becausemost of us know relatively little aboutDNA, it is easy to see that comparison
is complicated and that in order to make meaningful probabilistic conclusions
regarding identity, wemust employ standardised techniques andmake reference to
databases (and assumptions about populations).42 However, empirical research
indicates that facial comparison is also complicated and, when it comes to
strangers, surprisingly inaccurate.43 Moreover, empirical research suggests that
extraneous cues, such as circumstantial evidence or the opinions of an expert, are
likely to dramatically affect assessments regardless of their reliability.44
3. Burden shifting: substituting concessions and excuses for validity and
reliability
Rather than require the Crown actually to obtain opinions using demonstrably
reliable methods and repeatable techniques, trial and appellate courts have
exhibited a willingness to allow the incriminating opinions of investigators to go
before the jury on condition that some limitations—such as general problemswith
image reliability or the lack of a database—are disclosed. This obliges the defence
to negate the speculative, though purportedly cautious, opinions of experts rather
than require the experts to demonstrate to the court that they can actually do
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41 The idea that photographs produce reliable evidence or a sense of truth through their objective
rendering may also be a reason why many images are allowed to go before juries. Compare
J. Mnookin, ‘The Image of Truth’ (1998) 10 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 1–74; C. Guilshan,
‘A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Lies: Electronic Imaging and the Future of the Admissibility of
Photographic Evidence’ (1992) 18 Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal 365–80; M. Sturken and
L. Cartwright, Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture (Oxford University Press: 2001);
G. Porter, ‘Visual Culture in Forensic Science’ (2007) 39 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 81–91.
42 This hasnotpreventedmistakes andnumerous appeals over procedures and the expressionof results.
43 Humans are very good at recognising familiar faces, even from poor quality images: however, we
appear to be unaware that our expertise is limited to the faces of those we know well, and as a
result we overestimate our ability to determine whether two images are of the same unfamiliar
person (i.e. unfamiliar facematching). See J. Davis and T. Valentine, ‘CCTV on Trial: Matching Video
Images with the Defendant in the Dock’ (2008) 23 Applied Cognitive Psychology 482–505; M. Burton et
al., ‘Face Recognition in Poor-quality Video: Evidence from Security Surveillance’ (1999) 10 Psycho-
logical Science 243. This overconfidence also affects other fields where identification is important.
For example, governments rely on photographic identification documents such as passports to
establish the identity of people crossing borders. However, psychological research shows that even
people charged with checking these documents, and trained to do so, are likely to make many
errors. See R. Kemp, N. Towell and G. Pike, ‘When Seeing Should Not Be Believing: Photographs,
credit cards and fraud’ (1997) 11 Applied Cognitive Psychology 211–22.
44 For example, in a laboratory study undertaken by one of the authors, participants were asked to
decide if a CCTV image featured the ‘defendant’. Their decision was better predicted by the expert
opinion evidence they received on the matter than by the truth of the situation (i.e. whether the
‘defendant’ was actually in the images): R. Kemp, S. Heidecker and N. Johnston, ‘Identification of
Suspects from Video: Facial Mapping Experts and the Impact of their Evidence’, paper presented at
the 18thConference of the European Association of Psychology and Law,Maastricht, 2–5 July 2008.
what they claim. The decision in Atkins exemplifies the substitution of concessions
and excuses for validation studies and other indicia of reliability.45
In Atkins the witness makes numerous concessions. These include:
In evidence before the jury Mr Neave identified nine different factors
which could affect the reliability of his exercise. Many related to the
quality of the photographs and the various things which could affect
that. Another was pixilation, which is or can be image compression
when a photograph is transferred to a computer. Two more of his
stated risk factors were:
i) the possibility that two different people may appear
indistinguishable; and
ii) the fact that there exists no database of facial characteristics.
He also dealt with the particular quality of the CCTV photograph of
the offender, which was significantly limited by short duration, some
element of distortion at one edge, shadow and the sudden change
from dark to light when the door was opened and the person
appeared with light to one side beyond him.46
An observer might wonder at what point the cumulative effect of these conces-
sions (or ‘risk factors’) actually prevents photo comparison witnesses from
proffering expert opinions. In the absence of serious testing, published studies,
documented means of overcoming image problems, attempts to develop
databases or other means of assuring accuracy, allowing photo comparison
witnesses to testify is not unlike admiring the performance of the weavers in Hans
Christian Andersen’s The Emperor’s New Clothes. As it turns out, themere concession
of problems, like the ‘self-certified’ ability of the ‘weavers’, is not enough.47
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45 This is not unlike ‘the peculiar property of being invisible to any person who was unfit for his
position or inexcusably stupid’ in Andersen’s ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’ in Fairy Tales (2004,
originally published 1837) 91.
46 Dean Atkins and Michael Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 at [7] (italics added).
47 See C. Wilkinson and R. Evans, ‘Are Facial Image Analysis Experts Any Better than the General
Public at Identifying Individuals from CCTV Images?’ (2009) 49 Science & Justice 191, 195. This paper
misleadingly suggests, on the basis of a limited study, that because the authors scored better than a
selection of lay people ‘the results … support the utilisation of expert evidence in court and these
experts have demonstrated skills, knowledge and abilities superior to the general public’.
However, the real problem is, not whether so-called experts perform better than average, but
whether their opinions are sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence and whether criminal
trials can or should be obliged to cope with apparently error-prone opinions. Relative abilities
should not be conflated with reliability.
Concession does not inoculate against unreliability (or the very real risk that the
jury might misuse the opinion).48 Ordinarily, conceding serious and persistent
problems will provide a basis for the exclusion of evidence rather than a justifi-
cation for admission.
In addition, it is important to stress that the ‘technique’ used by the witness in
Atkins is not a standardised process but rather an incoherent amalgam of axioms,
commitments, descriptions and practices. Moreover, claims about the ability to
exclude, like claims made for superimposition and substitution ‘tests’, are
misleading.49 The inability to explain how ‘risk factors’ are credibly managed
means that additional ‘tests’ merely compound the existing limitations or inspire
inappropriate confidence rather than provide additional or independent checks.
Many of the ‘techniques’, whether dependent on quantification or qualification,
assume that image distortion is overcome—without explaining how—and that the
observer can make sense of resulting similarities and differences experientially.
A few additional points are worth making. First, the various concessions (in Atkins
and elsewhere) appear to have emerged largely in response to cross-examination
and criticism by defence experts (and others) rather than through study or experi-
mentation. Few seem to have been volunteered by facial mappers. Secondly,
making concessions does not overcome the problems inherent in the concessions.
If there are image reliability problems and there is no method for overcoming
them, then why should we be interested in apparent similarities between images?
Similarly, while it is important to acknowledge the lack of a database, acknowl-
edging its absence does not provide a credible basis for allowing the witness to
express an opinion that ought to be derived from a database or some other
empirical foundation. Thirdly, Neave contends that the camera angles and
perspectives used to obtain the reference photos were ‘virtually identical’.50 Just
how similar they need to be is not explained or disclosed. This is one of the
problems with the ‘technique’. How does the witness know they are taken from
the same angle and with the same lens? Is it supported by the appearance of
similarities in the various images and therefore tautological? Howdifferent do the
angles, lenses and lighting have to be before the exercise is invalid or unreliable?
Even a cursory examination of the reference images used by the analyst reveals
that the photographs of the Atkins brothers and their co-accused, Carty, are not
identical in circumstance or orientation. In the reference photograph of Dean
Atkins, supposedly a facial profile, both eyebrows can clearly be seen. The
160 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF
CASE NOTE
48 On ‘inoculation’, see R. Barthes, Mythologies (Paladin: London, 1973).
49 Dean Atkins and Michael Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 at [5], [6].
50 Ibid. at [6].
reference photographs of Carty and Michael Atkins are taken from a side
perspective whereas in the reference photograph of Dean Atkins the neck is
turned away to simulate that appearance. Do these differences matter and if not
why not? How much variation can be tolerated before the comparisons lose any
reliability? Fourthly, it is common practice for those engaged in photographic
comparison to be told who the police believe the perpetrator is and to be given
only two sets of images to compare. In the absence of ‘blinding’, experts are likely
to be biased by this information. There is compelling evidence that even experts
from established fields with quite elaborate formalised methods and training
encounter difficulty in overcoming such influences.51 Fifthly, the witness’s ‘tech-
nique’, axioms and approach are rhetorically based on some of the approaches
now routinely applied to DNA evidence. However, such parallels have limitations.
For photographic evidencemight in some circumstances lead to a positive identifi-
cation (especially when familiars are involved or discriminating features such as
the appearance of very unusual scars, blemishes or tattoos are not in dispute).52
In practice, substituting concessions (or declarations of inabilities) for evidence of
validity and reliability effectively imposes a reverse onus upon the defence. Rather
than require the Crown to demonstrate that incriminating expert opinion
evidence has probative value, incriminating opinions are admitted and left to
the defence to negate. Rather than exclude unreliable expert opinions and expert
opinions of unknown probative value, English judges leave incriminating opinion
to the trial and the fact-finder. They place great faith in a range of formal
protections (such as defence lawyers, cross-examination, opposing experts and
judicial directions), the lay jury and appellate courts.53 Admissibility jurispru-
dence and discretionary exclusions are rarely invoked to exclude incriminating
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51 In Australian cases the letter of instruction prepared by investigators frequently includes only
images of the perpetrator and the prime suspect. The implication, not always unstated, is that the
images are of the same person. Normally no alternative suspects are provided and in at least one
case the letter of instruction noted that the suspect had changed appearance, but invited the
analyst to use his experience to see through this attempted subterfuge. This is clearly a very
suggestive procedure and empirical evidence indicates that suggestions more subtle than these
can have profound effects on the decision-making of experts and non-experts alike. See I. Dror,
D. Charlton and A. Peron, ‘Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making
Erroneous Identifications’ (2006) 156 Forensic Science International 74–8; I. Dror and R. Rosenthal,
‘Meta-analytically Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of Forensic Experts’ (2008) 53 Journal
of Forensic Sciences 900–3.
52 These are very rarely, however, unique identifiers; even though they might be highly probative
(once image reliability issues are overcome or circumvented).
53 These are increasingly open to a range of critical perspectives, especially in the United States. See
K. Findley, ‘Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for the Truth’
(2008) 38 Seton Hall Law Review 893–974; B. Garrett and P. Neufeld, ‘Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions’ (2009) 95 Virginia Law Review 1–97.
opinion evidence of unknown probative value notwithstanding the dangers of
unfair prejudice to the accused.54 In consequence, the accused is confronted with
incriminating opinion of unknown reliability in the context of a circumstantial
case. The incriminating opinions are admissible on the condition that defects,
arguably fundamental and irreparable defects, are disclosed. This makes no sense
with regard to opinion evidence used routinely in the investigation and prose-
cution of crime, especially where it could be tested for validity and reliability.
Appellate courts defend this stance on the basis that there are many areas of
forensic science where there is no database and other experts are routinely
permitted to express opinions.
That conclusion is consistent with the practice of experts in a number
of fields to use this kind of scale of expressions of opinion. Such
expressions are commonly encountered, as counsel on both sides
confirmed and our own experience suggests, in many other fields of
comparison. Some random examples are comparisons of handwriting
or fibres, glass fragments or footwear patterns. In some of those there
is some, often very incomplete, data about the incidence of general
occurrence; in others there is no database.55
However, the fact that courts have traditionally allowed opinion evidence of
unknown, and frequently questionable, epistemic provenance should not be used
as a basis for the continued admission of incriminating opinion evidence. On this
point it is useful to contrast English laissez-faire with recent critical work
emanating from the United States and Canada.56
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54 G. Edmond, ‘Specialised Knowledge, the Exclusionary Discretions and Reliability: Re-assessing
Incriminating Opinion Evidence’ (2008) 31 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1–55.
55 Dean Atkins andMichael Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCACrim 1876 at [26]. Interestingly,many of these
other disciplines have a range of formal protocols designed to avoid some of the problems
encountered in facial mapping. Most forms of photographic comparison—such as footwear
impressions, by way of example—require very high quality images free from a range of distortions.
This stands in stark contrast with the images used in Atkins.
56 National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the US: A Path Forward (Academies Press:
Washington DC, 2009); S. Goudge, Commissioner, Report of the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology
in Ontario, 1 October 2008, available at <http://www.goudgeinquiry.ca/>, accessed 4 February 2010;
M. Saks and D. Faigman, ‘Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and How It Might Yet
Find It’ (2008) 4 Annual Review of Law & Social Science 149; M. Saks and J. Koehler, ‘The Coming
Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science’ (2005) 309 Science 892–5. Even the UK Law
Commission’s recent Consultation Paper places a premium on reliability, though its receptiveness
to opinions based on ‘expertise’ and ‘experience’ threatens to admit the kinds of evidence that a
reliability threshold might exclude: Law Commission, The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal
Proceedings in England and Wales: A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability, Consul-
tation Paper No. 190 (2009).
Finally, the existence of other incriminating evidence—like the provision of
similarity evidence on previous occasions—should not be used to support the
admission of incriminating expert opinion evidence. Incriminating expert
opinions need to be assessed on their own terms.57 Either the expert can do what
he or she claims, and can provide evidence to support that contention, or they
cannot. The absence of evidence necessarily raises questions about expertise.58
Long experience is not enough where there is a reasonable expectation that the
witnesses would have actually undertaken studies, published results or tested
themselves.59 Almost two decades after (Neave appeared in) Stockwell, it is not
enough to just identify problems about which to warn juries. Rather, courts,
prosecutors, investigators and the institutionalised forensic sciences must be
more proactive. It would be relatively straightforward for facial mappers (and
specialist photo comparison witnesses) to conduct proper tests of the reliability
of their evidence, and such tests should be seen as a minimum requirement for
the presentation of this evidence.60 Similarly, it is not unreasonable to expect
that over the last 20 years those working with images should have drawn up a set
of standard operating procedures designed to minimise error and should be
in a position to provide some information about the confidence intervals
surrounding their conclusions.61 Courts would then be in a position to
determine what level of reliability is acceptable and how to present the evidence to
jurors rather than excusing incriminating opinions because the state and the
experts are unwilling to undertake the necessary research.
In themeantime, if it is not possible to describe procedures for comparing images
that are demonstrably reliable, then that would seem to provide a proper basis for
the exclusion of expert photographic comparison evidence. The premium placed
on liberty, fairness and factual rectitude means that the accusatorial criminal
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57 See e.g. R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239 at [31]–[32].
58 H. Collins and R. Evans, Re-thinking Expertise (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2007).
59 Similarly, claims about impartiality, professional duties and standards and even novel methods of
eliciting expert opinion in the courtroom do not overcome the failure to ascertain validity and
reliability. See e.g. G. Edmond, ‘Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert
Evidence in Australian Civil Procedure’ (2009) 72 Law & Contemporary Problems 159.
60 See K. Kleinberg, P. Vanezis and M. Burton, ‘Failure of Anthropometry as a Facial Identification
Technique Using High-quality Photographs’ (2007) 52 Journal of Forensic Science 779.
61 The Chief Constables (UK) developed a loose set of recommendations for photographic
comparison, but these are so vague as to have very little impact on practice, admissibility or
reliability. See Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland,
National Working Practices in Facial Mapping (2003), especially Appendix 3.
trial is not the place to allow investigators and those with long experience or
impressive credentials to express their incriminating opinions.62
4. Conclusion: more reliable suits?
The Atkins appeal addresses the way a photo comparison expert might express a
subjective opinion. Curiously, earlier courts, and this is upheld in Atkins, suggest
that such a witnessmight, notwithstanding image distortion or the non-existence
of a database (and notwithstanding the apparent unwillingness of this particular
witness to individualise), give positive identification evidence. Atkins, in effect,
represents a jurisprudential backwater, largely indifferent to scientific processes,
the reliability of incriminating opinions, or the way fact-finders might under-
stand such evidence.
Recently, in Canada and the United States, judges, lawyers, psychologists and
forensic scientists have been wrestling with how to express incriminating
opinions. This has been a vexed issue, linked closely to several wrongful convic-
tions.63 In response to North American experience and the appeal in Atkins it is
important to recognise that there is no established method for attaching evidentiary
significance to alleged or apparent similarities. Even ignoring the fundamental
issues of image distortion and interpretation, there are problems associated with
how often different individuals might appear ‘indistinguishable’ and how
common particular facial features or combinations of facial features are among
relevant sub-populations—especially within families. Consequently, as things
stand there is no reasonable basis for allowing a person, however skilled in
anatomy, IT, photography, military surveillance, psychology or medical art, to
extrapolate about the significance of apparent similarities. In addition, theremay
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62 Arguably, in the absence of demonstrably reliable techniques, photographic comparison evidence
should only be used for the purposes of exclusion. Such an approach is not based upon the ability
of facial mappers to identify accurately differences (as opposed to similarities), but rather reflects
theway a criminal justice system committed to avoiding the conviction of innocent personsmight
manage the risk. Contrast the slightly duplicitous symmetry implied in Atkins at [25]. On the use of
investigators as experts, see G. Edmond and M. San Roque, ‘Quasi-Justice: Ad Hoc Experts and
Identification Evidence’ (2009) 32 Criminal Law Journal 8.
63 Goudge, Report of the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario, above n. 56; P. LeSage,
Commissioner, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Trial and Conviction of
James Driskell, January 2007, 149, 172, available at <http://www.driskellinquiry.ca/>; Report of the
Kaufman Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin, 1998, 340–1, available at <http://
www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/> (reports accessed 4 February
2010); J. Dwyer, P. Neufeld and B. Scheck, Actual Innocence (Random House: 2000). See also
D. McQuiston-Surrett and M. Saks, ‘The Testimony of Forensic Identification Science: What Expert
Witnesses Say and What Fact Finders Hear’ (2009) 33 Law & Human Behavior 436; A. Sanford and
L. Moxey, ‘New Perspectives on the Expression of Quantity’ (2003) 12 Current Directions in Psycho-
logical Science 240.
even be problems in leaving incriminating images before lay juries. We cannot
simply assume that fact-finders are capable of overcoming some of the illusions
created by image distortion, particularly in the context of a criminal trial where
photographic interpretations are likely to be influenced— consciously and uncon-
sciously (and perhaps irrationally)—by supplementary information.
While courts are obviously free to disregard mainstream approaches to scientific
research and expertise, they do so at considerable peril. Moreover, where they do
disregard orthodox methodological approaches they should have good reasons—
preferably good institutional reasons consistent with legal principle and institu-
tional values. In the accusatorial trial it is becoming increasingly difficult to
understand the continued admission of photographic comparison evidence
given: the state carrying the burden of proof; growing concern that defence
mechanisms do not consistently identify, expose or convey problems with expert
opinion; empirical concerns about jury comprehension and image interpretation;
along with the ability actually to assess the proficiency of photo comparison
analysts. It might be timely for senior judges (or legislators) to begin to review
their approaches to incriminating expert opinion in ways that embody the values
of an accusatorial system and the best advice of scientists (and empirical
researchers).64
In the absence of any indication of the reliability or validity, and given the
concerns we have raised about the unjustified assumptions underlying this
evidence, it is appropriate to be sceptical about its probative value. There are
good reasons to exclude this evidence on the grounds of unwillingness or inability
to demonstrate validity and reliability, inability to overcome (as opposed to
recognising and conceding) problems, the speculative nature of the expressions,
and the fact that witnesses tend to be biased by the way they are introduced to
the images and undertake their comparisons. The issue of attaching signifi-
cance to similarities raised in Atkins is a problem, but it is just one of a myriad of
serious and unaddressed problems that have become part of the way police,
lawyers and courts in England (and elsewhere) approach photographic com-
parison evidence.
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64 House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, Forensic Science on Trial (2005); National
Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the US: A Path Forward (National Academies
Press: Washington DC, 2009); E. Beecher-Monas, Evaluating Scientific Evidence (Cambridge University
Press: 2006). See also G. Edmond and D. Hamer, ‘Bacon’s Chickens: Empirical Studies of Evidence
Law’ in P. Cane and H. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Studies (2010)
(forthcoming).
‘But he doesn’t have anything on!’ said a little child. ‘Good Lord, listen
to the voice of the innocent,’ said the father. And one person
whispered to the next what the child had said. ‘But he doesn’t have
anything on!’ the entire crowd cried at last. The Emperor cringed,
because he thought they were right, but then he reasoned, ‘I have to
make it through the procession.’ He held himself even prouder than
before, and the chamberlains walked along carrying the train that
was not there at all.65
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